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Abstract  
 
The membership of the Group of 20 was selected without any 
official criteria. This paper investigates whether group membership 
can be explained through the consideration of several different 
factors that coincide with the mission of the organization. I found 
strong evidence that membership in the Group of 20 was based on 
some combination of land mass and economic output. The results 
demonstrate that these factors are highly predictive of group 
membership.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
 Visibility of the Group of 20 (G-20) has grown significantly in recent years as a 
result of the forum’s response to the most recent financial crisis. The membership of 
international organizations is often criticized for not including the right countries. Nations 
which are not included in the club question whether their exclusion is warranted relative 
to the other counties which are members. In order to establish whether the correct 
countries are in the G-20, it is important to understand the reason for the creation of this 
forum and the criteria utilized to make membership decisions.     
        Over the past fifty years developed and developing countries around the world created 
numerous alphanumeric groups in response to a variety of different concerns. The goals of each 
group varied based on the needs of its member countries and problems afflicting large portions of 
the world population. Large industrialized nations established the Group of 10 (G-10) specifically 
so the countries could lend to each other and avoid involving the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to finance balance of payment shortfalls.1 A few years later the Committee of 20 (C-20) 
convened every country on the IMF Executive Board which consisted of both developed and 
developing countries the return the major currencies to fixed exchange rate parities.2  
The most enduring and one of the more exclusive of these clubs is the Group of 8 
(referred to as the G-7 prior to the admission of Russia) which first assembled heads of state of 
six countries3 informally in the wake of an oil crisis in 1975 to discuss major issues and, “foster 
                                                     
1
  Roy Culpeper, “Systematic Reform At A Standstill: A Flock of Gs In Search of Global Financial 
Stability,” in Critical Issues in International Financial Reform ed. Albert Berry and Gustavo Indart (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 208.   
2
 Culpeper, 210.  
3
 Those invited were France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Canada joined one year later in 1976 and Russia was formally admitted to the group in 1997.  
cooperation on economic polic[ies].”4 The informal nature of the group allowed the group to 
address a wide variety of topics, and the results of the G-8 summits range from settling debates 
over the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to placing U.S. missile installations in strategic 
locations across Europe.5 The 1986 summit in Tokyo instituted regular meetings between Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the member nations.6 Unlike the IMF or World Bank, 
the G-8 does not have any permanent staff or administration. Presidency rotates yearly and the 
president hosts the summit and sets the agenda. Since world economic power was so highly 
concentrated within the G-7 and G-8, the group dominated the agenda for global financial 
governance for nearly three decades.7 
Globalization in the 1990s connected nations to their trading partners and financial 
markets around the world. Financial liberalization measures among emerging market countries to 
attract foreign capital and increase exports met with varying degrees of success. Financing from 
developed countries poured in to these new markets, creating domestic imbalances and even 
crises in some emerging economies. “Unlike crises of previous decades, there were a number of 
new ingredients. These included vulnerabilities resulting from rushed or inadequately sequenced 
liberalization processes, magnified exposure to imbalances arising from the large stakes 
international economic agents had accumulated in emerging markets, contagion effects derived 
from greater interdependence, and inflexible exchange rate regimes.”8 Mexico was the first to 
experience a crisis in 1994, followed in 1997 by South Korea and many other economies in 
Southeast Asia, Russian in 1998, and the Brazilian currency crisis from 1998-1999. Throughout 
this period of financial instability traditional crisis indicators such as low growth rate, high fiscal 
                                                     
4
 Nicholas Bayne, “History of the G7 Summit” University of Toronto G8 Research Group,  1997   
5
 Bayne, “History of the G7 Summit.” 
6
 Government of Canada, “History of the Group of Seven,” 2010 Iqaluit G7 Web Page, (Jan 20 2010), 
http://www.g7.gc.ca/hist-eng.html (accessed March 2011).   
7
 Culpeper, 212. 
8
 Vanessa Rubio-Marquez, "The G20: A Practitioner’s Perspective," In Networks of Influence?, ed. 
Leonardo Martinez-Diaz and Ngaire Woods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 20. 
deficits, inflation, and others failed to accurately identify markets about to crash.9 Due to 
globalization the balance of economic power shifted more rapidly away from the G-7 countries. 
The G-7 countries share of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 56.313% in 1980 and 
declined only 0.491% by 1990, but purchasing power parity dropped by 6.754% between 1990 
and 2000.10   
The contagion effects posed by these new types of crises concerned the developed 
countries significantly. Beginning in 1998, “there were calls by the leaders of the Group of Seven 
industrial powers to reform the global financial architecture.”11 Financial crises posed a legitimate 
threat to globalization and the future of economic openness that the developed nations sought. In 
addition to reforming the rules of the global economy, the increasing importance of emerging 
market economies led these countries to pressure the industrialized nations for a larger role in key 
decision-making bodies. Furthermore, “the G7 understood that the crises originated in a group of 
middle-income countries, which had recently pursued liberalization processes and were thus more 
open and vulnerable to external imbalances. Therefore, the problem had to be tackled in 
cooperation with the representatives of these emerging economies.”12        
During the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, President Clinton invited “systemically 
significant” economies to meeting Washington as the Group of 22. This collection of countries 
included industrial, transitional, and developing economies, though their discussions were, 
“focused on the minutiae of financial instability rather than on reforming the architecture of the 
global financial system.”13 Out of this summit came a report on the observance of standards and 
codes, but more significant was the cooperation displayed by a diverse group of nations in 
                                                     
9
 Rubio-Marquez, 20. 
10
 Calculated using data provided by Economy Watch at www.EconomyWatch.com 
11Culpeper, 204.  
12
 Rubio-Marquez, 21.  
13
 Culpeper, 215. 
response to a crisis. Consequently, when the G-8 met in September 1999 they unveiled the 
“Group of 20” countries designated to meet for discussions on financial reform.14 
 In December 1999 in Berlin, the Group of 20 (G-20) finance ministers and central 
bank governors convened to discuss key economic and financial policy issues to foster 
greater cooperation towards the goal of stable world economic growth. This group 
resulted from the need of the Group of 8 Finance Ministers to obtain input and gain 
support from a broader range of countries in order to build consensus on international 
issues.15 The announcement names nineteen countries as well as the European Union as a 
whole, and representatives of the IMF and the World Bank. The individual countries 
named to the G-20 included all of the G-8 nations, as well as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.    
This paper will establish a methodology to explore the criteria to select G-20 
members.  First, existing literature on G-20 membership will be reviewed to establish the 
criteria that will be considered in the experiment. Then explanatory variables will be 
introduced and used to represent each criteria, their sources and creation. Next, the 
relationship between G-20 membership and the explanatory variables will be analyzed. 
Finally, experimental conclusions will be presented and discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
14
 John Burgess, “Trying to Keep Recovery Going; World Financial Elite Gather to Assess Reform 
Efforts,”  The Washington Post, 23 September, 1999.  
15
 John Kirton, “What is the G-20?,” G-20 Information Centre, (1999),  
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/g20watisit.html (accessed March 2011). 
II.  Literature Review  
 
To determine the criteria for membership in the G-20, a literary search was 
conducted to locate sources sanctioned by the organization to see if official metrics were 
measured or specific conditions prescribed that prospective member countries are 
required to meet.  In the “About G-20” section of the G-20 organizational website, the 
sanctioned response to the question proclaims “there are no formal criteria for G-20 
membership.”16 This is perhaps not surprising since publishing any official guidelines 
would only be criticized by excluded countries, or those which are close may agitate for 
inclusion. Without formal standards for members, I will use a combination of G-20 
documents, primary, and secondary sources to extrapolate those factors which led to 
admittance in the club.     
 While the website and other official documents abstain from sharing the precise 
basis for G-20 membership, they provide a variety of inexact moderations. Immediately 
after the G-20 website declines to share the specific factors which countries were judged 
on, it explains, “it was considered important that countries and regions of systemic 
significance be included. Aspects such as geographical balance and population played a 
major part.”17 These characteristics are echoed in the summary of the first meeting of G-
20 leaders. The communiqué from the Berlin meeting in December 1999 states that, “the 
G-20 was established to broaden the discussions on key economic and financial policy 
issues among systemically significant economies and promote cooperation to achieve 
                                                     
16
 Group of 20, “Frequently Asked Questions” G-20 France 2011, (2011), 
http://www.g20.org/about_faq.aspx (accessed March 2011).  
17
 Group of 20, “Frequently Asked Questions.”  
stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all Both documents mention a 
‘systemic significance’ which is a vague term referring to economic and financial policy 
issues. This indicates that G-20 membership is contingent on how vital a country is to the 
functioning of the world economy and financial markets relative to other countries.  
A history of the G-20 produced by the organization in 2007 supports this membership 
theory, explaining “it was accepted, however that countries had to be systemically 
important to the global economy and have the ability to contribute to global economic 
and financial stability.”18 Ability to contribute to global economic and financial stability 
is determined by the size and power of a country’s economy and financial market 
compared to all others. In a 2005 magazine article the first G-20 chairman, Canadian 
Finance Minister Paul Martin, explained the Asian financial crisis prompted the creation 
of the new permanent international forum. Prior to 1999, the G-7 had considered creating 
a broader forum for world economic discussion that included emerging economies, but 
the crisis’s effects on advanced economies spurred the development of the G-20.19 The 
official history of the G-20 explains the need to expand the G-7 within the context of, 
“the increasing interdependence of all countries stemming from the ongoing expansion of 
cross-border trade and capital flows, and the parallel rise in the exposure of countries to 
financial shocks emanating from far beyond their borders, underscores the importance of 
broadening of international economic and financial cooperation.”20 This run-on sentence 
illuminates a few of the factors determining a country’s systemic significance, trade and 
                                                     
18
 Group of 20, “The Group of 20: A History,” Meeting of G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, 18 November 2007,  21.  
19
 Paul Martin, “A Global Answer to Global Problems” A New Leaders’ Forum,” Foreign Affairs, 2005, 
84.3ed.  
20
 Group of 20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 22.   
capital flows. Clues to other factors can be found in the statistics touted in official G-20 
materials highlighting common characteristics which demonstrate the relative power of 
the members. G-20 countries represent approximately 85% of global gross domestic 
product, nearly two thirds of the world’s population, and close to 15% of the land mass.21  
Another factor which G-20 countries dominate the rest of the world are international 
reserve holdings, by 2006 the non G-7 members of the G-20 share of global reserves was 
43%.22 
Political freedom is another characteristic which was likely considered when 
reviewing countries for membership in the G-20. When the group was first announced on 
September 26, 1999, “Indonesia, which [was] being roiled by student riots and by 
violence following a vote for independence in East Timor, was left out of the G-20 even 
though it is one of the leading economies in Asia and the fourth most populous country in 
the world.”23 However, the G-20 assembled three months later for its first meeting in 
Berlin, Indonesia attended as a member in good standing. Evidently the omission from 
the first announcement was a message to Indonesia to respect the East Timor vote for 
independence out of respect for the political freedom of self-determination. One month 
after the initial G-20 snub, United Nations forces were permitted to take over the 
administration of East Timor.24 Respect for political freedom as a variable in country 
selection is confirmed by the official history of the G-20 which describes Indonesia’s 
                                                     
21
 Group of 20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 22.   
22
 Group of 20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 24.   
23
 “Canada to Head New G-20 Group Global Forum Will Tackle Financial Crises,” The Toronto Star, 26 
September  1999: 14.        
 
24
 “UN Official: Indonesia to End Government In East Timor 1999” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 27 
October 1999.  
selection thusly, “the ability of Indonesia to participate effectively in the Group in light of 
the political instability in the country at that time was also initially an issue. However, 
such concerns had evaporated by the time of the first ministerial meeting in Berlin in 
December 1999.”25 By ending the occupation of East Timor, Indonesia achieved the 
political freedom standard and won membership in the G-20. John Kirton, the founder of 
the G-20 Research Group sums up the importance of domestic political freedom with this 
observation, “Indonesia had a place reserved for it once it proved that its embryonic 
democratic revolution, and the respect for human rights and anticorruption commitment 
that came with it, were real. Malaysia was excluded, not because of its flirtation with 
capital controls but because its leader’s autocratic treatment of its well respected finance 
minister defied the basic standards of democracy and the rule of law.”26  
One final factor can be determined from the writings of Vanessa Rubio-Marquez 
who the Secretary of the G-20 during Mexico’s presidency of the organization in 2003. 
She circumscribes the G-20’s initial mandate to three goals, “(1) facilitate agreement on 
domestic and international action, institutional arrangements, and priorities to prevent and 
resolve crises; (2) provide legitimacy to the process of globalization, notably by 
promoting its benefits worldwide to prevent a backlash against it; and (3) build consensus 
around key international financial issues that would facilitate decision-making within 
other institutions, primarily the IMF and World Bank.”27 The first and third mandates are 
largely covered by variables that describe the “strategic significance” of a country 
                                                     
25
 Group of 20, “The Group of 20: A History,” 24. 
26
 John Kirton, “From G7 to G20: Capacity, Leadership and Normative Diffusion in 
Global Financial Governance” G-20 Research Group Information Centre, (2005), 5.     
27
 Rubio-Marquez, 21. 
previously described in this section. In order to adequately represent the second mandate 
a nation must embody the process of globalization, by demonstrating the aforementioned 
political freedom as well as levels of economic freedom. According to the IMF, 
globalization refers to, “an extension beyond nation border of the same market forces that 
have operated for centuries at all levels of human economic activity.”28 To achieve these 
aims, “countries must be prepared to embrace the policies needed,” that often involve the 
liberalization of economic restrictions.29 Rubio-Marquez explains that aside from creating 
instability, financial crises, “could jeopardize the future of economic openness.”30 If the 
preservation of economic openness was concern for the organization, then the economic 
freedom of G-20 countries should be a prize attribute. To legitimize the process of 
globalization, the G-20 countries model the implementation of economic freedom and 
reap the benefits to growth and output.   
After reviewing the relevant literature I determined that the variables that describe 
G-20 membership are: trade, foreign investment, foreign exchange reserves, economic 
output, population, land mass, political freedom, and economic freedom.        
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 
 
The data portion of this section will take each variable selected to describe G-20 
membership, establish a metric used to measure that variable, describe the source used to 
obtain that data, and the manner in which the data was collected. In the methodology 
                                                     
28
 IMF Staff, "Issues Brief – Globalization," The International Monitary Fund, (2008), 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2008/053008.htm (accessed April 2011). 
29
 IMF Staff, “Issues Brief.”    
30
 Rubio-Marquez, 21. 
portion I will explain the techniques used to establish the relative ability of each variable 
to accurately describe the membership of the G-20.     
 
Data  
 
Since the purpose of this investigation is to evaluate the shared attributes of G-20 
members using a variety of different factors. For each factor, a metric was selected that 
described the variation between nations with respect to that factor. Whenever possible, 
metrics were manipulated to present the relative portion of the world total each country 
accounted for. This modification normalized the units of independent variables, making 
comparisons between variables easier. The process of and rational for creating all derived 
variables will be explained below. To be part of the sample base for the study, a country 
needed observations recorded for at least six of the eight metrics explained below. One 
hundred and eighty two countries met this standard for inclusion in the sample.            
Factors 
Land Mass- A metric for relative land mass was created using the most recent estimates 
for every country observed in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact Book.  
Each country’s land mass was measured in square miles and divided by the sum of the 
land mass of every country in the world, to yield the measure of relative land mass.       
Population- The metric for population was developed from data furnished by the Penn 
World Table Version 7. Country populations from 2000-2009 were averaged to control 
for year-to-year fluctuations and divided by the sum of each country’s average to yield 
the relative average population from 2000-2009.   
Economic Output- To capture the total economic output of each country while 
controlling for brief economic fluctuations such as oil prices, the total real gross domestic 
product data was averaged from 2000 to 2009, according to the Penn World Table 
Version 7. The data was normalized by dividing each country’s individual average GDP 
by the sum of every country’s average GDP to yield relative share of world GDP from 
2000-2009.     
Trade- While exports are already factored measured into national GDP, imports must be 
a independent variable to fully capture each nation’s full trade volume. Data on volume 
of imports for each country was taken from the CIA World Fact Book. This figure was 
divided by the sum of every country’s combined imports to yield the relative share of 
imports.    
Foreign Investment- Foreign direct investment (FDI) measures the inflow of investment 
to domestic enterprises from investors in other countries. This metric demonstrates how 
much of the rest of the world’s capital is tied to performance in specific domestic 
economies. To control for year-to-year fluctuations, FDI data from 2000 to 2009 was 
obtained from the Penn World Tables and averaged. Each country’s relative share of FDI 
was calculated by dividing each nation’s average individual FDI during the period by the 
sum of every country’s FDI.     
Foreign Reserve Holdings- International reserves encompass all foreign currency 
deposits, bonds, gold, special drawing rights and IMF reserve positions held by each 
individual country.31 To compute the relative size of each country’s international 
reserves, I used international reserve estimates compiled by Global Finance Magazine 
from the most recent World Bank reports. Each country’s estimate was divided by world 
aggregate international reserve holdings to yield relative international reserve holdings.    
Political Freedom- The metric I choose to assess political freedom was developed by 
Freedom House. Freedom House distinguishes between a nation’s official government 
policies and the freedom of its people. Their annual Freedom in the World survey focuses 
on the rights and liberties enjoyed by citizens, as Freedom House experts rate each 
country based on 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. These 
answers are translated into an individual country score, from 1 (indicating most free) to 7 
(indicating least free) for political rights and civil liberties.32 Since for all the previous 
variables a higher score translated to an increased likelihood of G-20 membership, for 
purposes of this study both political freedom and civil liberties scores were totaled, 
subtracted from the total amount of points available, and divided by the total number of 
points to yield a positive metric for the percentage of points not lost.              
Economic Freedom- To represent economic freedom, the metric chosen was the Index of 
Economic Freedom produced jointly by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal. This index examines ten different characteristics of economic freedom, such as 
property rights and freedom from corruption, based on the principles of empowerment of 
                                                     
31
 Tina Arida, “International Reserves by Country- 2010 Ranking,” Global Finance Magazine, (2011), 
Available from http://www.gfmag.com/tools/global-database/economic-data/10212-international-reserves-
by-country-2010-ranking.html#axzz1JpUkFeJR, (accessed March 2011).  
32
 “Freedom in the World – Methodology,” Freedom House, (2010), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=363&year=2010, (accessed March 
2011)  
the individual, non-discrimination, and open competition. These categories are rated on a 
scale from 1 (indicating least free) to 10 (indicating most free).  The ten scores are 
combined to generate an overall country score out of one hundred.33 For comparison, 
each country’s score was divided by all one hundred points available to derive the 
measure of economic freedom. 
Methodology 
 This study assumes G-20 countries chosen should rank 1 through 19 based on the 
membership criteria used to determine admission.  To determine what the actual criteria 
for membership were, variables described above were combined to achieve this perfect 
ranking. The goal is to model the behavior of the binary dependent variable G-20 
membership for every country observed, where 1 indicates countries with membership in 
the G-20 and 0 indicates those excluded, using the explanatory variables described above. 
This study analyzes G-20 membership through the use of probit regression with multiple 
regressors and through the creation of derived rankings which combine two or more of 
the explanatory variables.  
 
Probit Regression 
 A probit regression is a nonlinear regression model developed specifically to 
explain the behavior of binary dependent variables like G-20 membership. Since binary 
dependent variables only have values of 0 and 1, probit models can more accurately 
                                                     
33
 Terry Miller and Anthony B. Kim, “Defining Economic Freedom,” In Index of Economic Freedom by 
Terry Miller and others (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2011), 21.  
model the data because the probabilities they produce only fall between 0 and 1.34  The 
probit regression will demonstrate which explanatory variables are statistically significant 
to the probability of G-20 membership thus extraneous variables can be eliminated. For 
this reason, the probit model is useful for identifying which variables determine the 
majority of the variation between members and non-members.35 Unlike linear 
regressions, Coefficients for the significant variables in a probit model produce a 
cumulative normal distribution function which can be applied to a specific country to 
determine its z-score, and from that z-score the probability it is a member of the G-20.  
Therefore, rankings for the probit model represent the countries in order from 
most likely to be admitted to the G-20 to least. Based on the variables included, the probit 
model may generate z-scores for certain countries indicating a membership probability of 
100%.  Rankings using the cumulative normal distribution function produce false 
positives and false negatives among countries. False positives identify any countries 
which have an argument for admission based on these characteristics. False negatives 
highlight those countries which maybe have been included in the G-20 for reasons 
outside the hypothesized criteria. Output for the probit model will be applied with actual 
country observations to determine predictive ability. This model controls for dissimilar 
units of measurement and the use of contiguous and discrete variables together.     
 
 
                                                     
34
 James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, Introduction to Econometrics, 2nd ed. (Boston: Pearson Education 
Inc., 2007), 389. 
35
 Stock, 390.  
Derived Rankings 
 Probit regressions will be helpful to analyze which variables are important to 
determining the overall movement of the data, but will fail to model G-20 membership 
accurately when two or more variables are viewed together on a sliding scale. Combining 
the most significant variables by multiplying their observations together provides a better 
view of the overall significance of a particular country because relative advantages or 
deficiencies in particular categories will be magnified. While the inclusion of an 
additional measure may not change the probability of G-20 membership for most 
countries, it may have been the criteria to move a country into or out of the top nineteen. 
Once the factors important to G-20 membership are established, explanatory variables 
will then be weighted based their perceived importance to the membership process. 
Evidence of the relative importance of the explanatory variables to the G-20 selection 
process will be improvement to the predictive rankings when that variable is weighted 
more heavily.   
Weighting for the purposes of this study means applying some percentage to each 
factor in a derived variable such that the sum of the percentages for all variables will 
equal one hundred. In order to normalize the effect of the weighting percentage on all the 
explanatory variables, the weight for each variable will be multiplied by mean of 
observations for the variable listed in the summary statistics in Table 1. The ranking 
which includes the largest number of G-20 countries in its top nineteen positions will be 
considered the most descriptive of membership criteria.             
 
IV.  Results  
 
     The probit model in Column 1 of Table 2 none of the variables are statistical 
significant at the 5% level. All of the p-values fall between .35 and .47, so this suggests 
that many of the explanatory variables could be endogenous thus explain much of the 
same variation between countries. Coefficients for relative FDI and imports are negative.  
Since all variables were designed to show positive correlation with G-20 membership, it 
is unlikely that increases FDI or imports would decrease a country’s chances of inclusion 
in the G-20. None of these relationships can be negatively correlated with G-20 
membership, so relative FDI and imports were excluded from the model in Column 2. 
The result was the GDP became statistically significant at the 5% level and land mass 
became statically significant at the 10% level.  
When FDI and imports were regressed by themselves as a function of G-20 
membership on their own in Column 3, FDI maintained the negative coefficient while the 
coefficient for imports switched to positive and became statistically significant. In 
Column 4 all the variables not demonstrating significance at either the 5 or 10% levels 
were eliminated. This left GDP, land mass, and imports to be regressed as a function of 
G-20 membership. All coefficients in this model were positive, but only GDP and land 
mass were significant at the 5% level. Imports were excluded from Column 5, and both 
of the remaining variables showed significance at the 5% level. The resulting probit 
model was: 
Pr(Membership|Land Mass, GDP)=Φ(-3.766754 + 1 144.5543 * Land Mass +228.7388* GDP) 
Table 3 shows the rankings by z-value of the cumulative distribution function resulting 
from the application of this equation to the country observations. The model was highly 
predictive, ranking seventeen G-20 members in the top nineteen. Eight of the G-20 
countries were 100% likely to be included in the G-20. South Africa was the lowest G-20 
country on the list with a probability of only 49.18%, but only missed the cut for 
membership by five places. While GDP had both a larger coefficient and smaller p-value 
in the model, it is unclear which variable might have received greater weight in the 
decision-making process.  
 To determine which explanatory variables that can be combined to create the most 
accurate derived variable rankings I assessed the rankings of all the independent variables 
and observed the following:  
 Relative Land Mass – 11/19 G-20 countries concentrated in the top ten, but the distribution of 
G-20 countries in the ranking is quite wide after that.  The United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Korea lag behind the others in positions 74 and 102 respectively.  
Relative Average Population - 10/19 G-20 countries once again concentrated in the top ten, the 
distribution is small than Relative land mass with all nineteen countries placing in the top fifty. 
France and the United Kingdom barely miss the cut off at positions 20 and 21, while Saudi 
Arabia and Australia lag at 44 and 46.  
Relative Average Total Gross Domestic Product – 16/19 Most predictive factor for G-20 
rankings, with G-20 countries filling sixteen of the top seventeen positions. Distribution of G-20 
countries in the rankings is highly concentrated with all countries ranked 26 (South Africa) or 
better.  
Relative Average Foreign Direct Investment – 11/19 More than half of the countries ranked in 
the top 25 in Foreign Direct Investment were members of the G-20. Though there is a drop of in 
G-20 countries after position 20, all members placed in the top 50, with Indonesia ranked 50th.  
Relative International Reserves- 11/19 Once again more than half of the countries ranked in the 
top 25 for International Reserves were members of the G-20. Seventeen out of nineteen G-20 
countries placed in the top 30 for this variable. All G-20 countries ranked in the top 40, with 
South Africa ranked 40th.   
Political Freedom – 6/19 A discrete variable, six G-20 members received top scores in political 
freedom. All but three members scored in the top half of countries, while Russia, China, and 
Saudi Arabia were close to the bottom.  
Economic Freedom – 5/19 Another discrete variable, but used a 100 point scale with much more 
variation in scores from country to country. Wide distribution in member scores, six ranked in the 
bottom half. The lowest was Russia which ranked 142.  
Relative Imports - 13/19 Nine of the top ten places are occupied by G-20 countries. Brazil is 
ranked 20th, just beyond the cut off. All G-20 members ranked in the top 50, lagging countries 
were South Africa and Argentina who placed 34 and 46 respectively.       
Findings  
Total average GDP is the most predictive variable by 16%, properly predicting three 
more countries than the next closest variable which was relative trade. Land mass, population, 
FDI, and international reserves were in the next tier of variables. Each placed ranked slightly 
more than half the G-20 countries in the top nineteen. Variance in G-20 rankings was by far the 
broadest for land mass. Top population rankings featured the most unique countries, but did not 
predict G-20 members as accurately. Conversely, international reserves and FDI featured similar 
countries in the top rankings. G-20 nations were more concentrated near the top for international 
reserve rankings. Based the probit regression, derived variables should include GDP and land 
mass combined as the foundation for the ranking. Political and economic freedom can be 
employed to drop the ranking of non-G-20 countries which have better relative rankings than 
members but may have more restrictive societies.    
 Land mass and GDP when combined with multiplication in Table 4 rank seventeen G-20 
members in the top nineteen countries, and fourteen of the top fifteen. Once again Span and Iran 
are the non-G-20 countries in the top nineteen, while the members which do not make the 
rankings change to South Africa at 21 and lagging is South Korea at 36. The majority of non-G-
20 countries ahead of South Africa and South Korea were ranked highly based on their relative 
land mass rather than GDP. The probit coefficients produced a model which balanced land mass 
and GDP fairly equally. When I tried to use a system of weighting to change the relative 
importance of land mass and GDP I found that the rankings did not shift at all. Weighting of 
60/40, 80/20, or even 99/1 were all attempted on but did not shift the rankings at all. Using 
multiplication to create derived variables became a limitation when I wanted to change the 
relative weights of different variables. Regardless of whether .6 or .01 was the initial multiplier, it 
the same result was created because the function was entirely multiplicative. 
     Without weighting, the rankings could be further improved by including other types of 
explanatory variables together. Based on the individual variable rankings, I paired GDP and 
imports since they had the greatest predicative ability for G-20 membership. This ranking placed 
fifteen G-20 countries in the top nineteen, and seemed to split the difference between the two 
categories. Spain remained the top ranked non-G-20 country, but the other three countries 
included were the small but prosperous countries of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Hong Kong. 
Consequently, Iran falls significantly and ranks above only two G-20 countries, South Africa and 
Argentina. South Korea jumps from last in the previous derived ranking to tenth for GDP and 
imports. Imports as an explanatory variable provides much unique variation between ranks 11 and 
30 but solidifies the general position of G-20 countries at the top of the rankings. Other 
combinations of two variables do not produce rankings more accurate than GDP and land mass. 
The discrete variables of political and economic freedom do not have the variance to significantly 
preference members above non-members when multiplied with only one other variable. In 
addition, too many G-20 countries lag behind the top twenty countries significantly in both 
rankings. FDI and international reserves preference developed countries too highly, whereas 
population improves the ranking of too many low income countries.  
 For derived variables using three components it is logical to combine the three factors 
which produced the best results using two variables; GDP, land mass, and imports. This derived 
variable produces an extremely strong ranking which predicts seventeen of the nineteen countries, 
and has South Korea and South Africa ranked just outside of the G-20 cut off at positions 20 and 
22. None of the other combinations of three variables could balance the characteristics of the G-
20 nations as evenly, and they did not produce rankings that model membership as accurately. 
With three large relative variables modeling G-20 member attributes, I then tried to purge the two 
remaining non-members from the top nineteen spots. To eliminate Spain without causing 
collateral damage for other G-20 countries was not possible because Spain ranked higher across 
all the explanatory variables then the perennial lagging countries of South Africa and Argentina. 
Trying to remove Spain would be impossible, trying to remove Iran was not.       
 Variables to remove Iran without shifting the rankings drastically would have to be the 
descriptive statistics of political or economic freedom where it fared poorly relative to the G-20. 
Members ranked much higher for political freedom than they did for economic freedom. For 
political freedom only three G-20 countries ranked in the bottom half, compared to six for 
economic freedom. In addition, the political freedom scores for Russia and China were not going 
to push them out of the top nineteen when balanced with the other variables, though Saudi Arabia 
would likely lose position. Ultimately, when the new derived variable was created for both 
political and economic freedom using the factors from the previous derived variable, the one 
including political freedom was more predictive. Table 5 shows a near perfect ranking that 
predicts eighteen out of nineteen possible countries and ranks South Africa just beyond the cut off 
at position 22. No other ranking generated could dislodge Spain for reasons stated above. 
Combining all of the explanatory variables multiplicatively into one derived variable produced a 
strong ranking predicting sixteen of nineteen countries, and all G-20 members placed in the top 
twenty-five.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 The variables I choose successfully modeled the G-20 membership using either a probit 
model or multiplicative combination. Economic output and land mass were the best predictors of 
G-20 membership, and combining the two factors into one variable enhanced their predictive 
ability. The most accurate derived ranking utilized GDP, land mass, imports, and political 
freedom to achieve a near perfect ranking. While the derived ranking model predicted a higher 
percentage of G-20 countries correctly, 94.7% compared to 89.5%, rankings for both models 
were very similar and successfully ranked all G-20 countries in the top twenty-five. Adding 
factors for political freedom and imports improved the rankings, but did not increase the total 
variation between countries significantly. Since I could develop such an accurate ranking 
provides empirical evidence that some criteria were used in the selection process for the G-20.   
 Modeling G-20 membership came very close to predicting all G-20 countries, but even 
the most accurate ranking produced a false negative and false positive. South Africa was the G-20 
country most likely to be left out of the top nineteen in the model used. It lagged behind the other 
countries (both developed and emerging) in most of the economic indicators, and did not place in 
the top fifteen in any ranking of the explanatory variables. However, if geographic balance was 
considered South Africa has a strong case for membership as the top finishing African country in 
many of these rankings. By offering South Africa membership, the G-20 ensures that the African 
perspective is represented.   
 As the false negative, Spain is a more difficult case to understand. Spain was consistently 
in the top nineteen countries is practically every ranking, while always finishing ahead of a few 
G-20 members. If geographic balance is considered again, Spain does rank below all the 
European members in all but one ranking. Moreover, the ranking where Spain places above the 
European members multiplicatively combines GDP and land mass. As explained above this 
ranking overstates the importance of land mass to G-20 membership. While Spain is ranked 
above the United Kingdom, no one would argue that it could match the United Kingdom’s 
“strategic significance” to world affairs. Asia is represented by more countries than Europe, but 
the breadth interests and geographic regions represented is much greater.  
Spain gets indirect representation from both the European Union (EU) and European 
Central Bank (ECB), but the four European members get extra representation through those same 
bodies. Whichever country holding the chair of the EU or ECB becomes that organization’s 
representative to G-20 summits. As a political organization, the European Union ranks at or near 
the top of every ranking. Soon after the creation of the G-20, the EU became a currency union as 
well, greatly heightening the importance of the ECB to global stability. Since plans for this were 
known at the time of the creation of the group, including these bodies increase their international 
legitimacy while expecting that the importance of both bodies in international affairs would grow. 
In addition, the balance of developed and emerging market countries close to evenly split.  
Depending on how developed one considers South Korea, the number of developed countries is 
either eight or nine, certainly not enough that the inclusion of Spain would have tipped that 
balance. 
 It was clear that all the European G-7 countries would all be admitted to the new group, 
and since including Spain would caused other developed and developing European countries to 
demand admission, they substituted Spain for broad EU representation. Through this action, the 
G-20 was able to avoid membership challenges from other European states, and supporting the 
new organizations in anticipation of their strategic significance. In the process the European 
members also got extra representation in the group. Since the G-7 countries made the 
membership decisions, leaving out Spain was the logical decision.           
       Some level of collinearity between the variables was inevitable in this study of relative 
global power. Causal relationships between a country’s geographic or demographic attributes and 
the strength of its economic and political systems are complex. However, relative global power or 
“strategic significance” is not derived in a vacuum. In order for a country to score highly in one 
attributes, many other conditions must be met. The reason for the creation of the G-20 and focus 
on economic stability is the collinearity developing between domestic economies around the 
world. Economic fluctuation in strategically significant countries may have a large affect on 
many others, but as globalization continues the chain of cause and effect will get longer and 
longer.     
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VII. Appendix  
 
A.1.    – List of Countries Used in Sample  
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Republic of 
Costa Rica 
Cote d`Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovak Republic 
Slovenia 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St.Vincent & 
Grenadines 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad &Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab 
Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
Table 1  
Summary Statistics for movement in country ranking and effect on G-20 membership  
 This table shows the spread of the data for all eight independent variables. Observations are for the same 182 countries 
for each of the eight variables. All variables except for political freedom and economic freedom are relative measures of the 
particular factor. For variables population, GDP, and FDI, the observation used are relative measures of each country’s ten 
year average from 2009-2000 for the given variable. Countries which received no foreign direct investment for one or more of 
the years in the sample received the relative average of zero.  
 
 
 
Land Mass Pop GDP FDI Int. Reserves 
Political 
Freedom 
Economic 
Freedom Imports 
Mean 0.0051222 0.00455767 0.0049009 0.005183 0.0054945 0.6686813 0.574357 0.0050359 
Standard Error 0.0010369 0.00126015 0.0013117 0.001153 0.0017294 0.0140971 0.012125 0.0010176 
Median 0.0009261 0.0009592 0.0004422 0.000411 0.0004435 0.675 0.5955 0.0005375 
Mode #N/A #N/A #N/A 0 0 0.9 0 0.0002857 
Standard Deviation 0.0139881 0.0170003 0.0176955 0.015552 0.0233305 0.19018 0.163577 0.0137278 
Sample Variance 0.0001957 0.00028901 0.0003131 0.000242 0.0005443 0.0361684 0.026757 0.0001885 
Kurtosis 33.46165 73.7705867 71.507308 38.26558 106.80442 -1.245351 4.619661 36.580253 
Skewness 5.3708052 8.2701303 7.7536728 5.581851 9.7133886 -0.260351 -1.77372 5.4438431 
Range 0.1207179 0.17049885 0.1890047 0.140727 0.2775364 0.6 0.897 0.1215205 
Minimum 1.28E-06 0.00000517 3.32E-06 -8E-05 0 0.3 0 3.959E-06 
Maximum 0.1207192 0.17050402 0.1890081 0.140646 0.2775364 0.9 0.897 0.1215245 
Sum 0.9322424 0.8294959 0.8919696 0.943245 1.0000003 121.7 104.533 0.9165336 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2  
 
Probit regression of G-20 membership as a function of land mass and GDP   
 
 
Variables 
(1) 
G20 
(2) 
G20 
(3) 
G20 
(4) 
G20 
(5) 
G20 
Land Mass 
1580.624 
(2009.194) 
356.0672 
(195.3199)* 
156.0785 
(68.1347)** 
144.5543 
(56.05755)** 
Population 
859.3974 
(1124.527) 
193.1535 
(155.8113) 
GDP 
2009.248 
(2183.301) 
175.9412 
(79.98527)** 
202.2771 
(99.59951)** 
228.7388 
(61.57636)** 
FDI 
-386.3259 
(404.3164) 
-30.71665 
(28.2074) 
Int. Reserves 
480.6235 
(546.8212) 
80.58928 
(61.96879) 
Political Freedom 
22.24308 
(31.29418) 
4.160792 
(3.710946) 
Economic Freedom 
73.71836 
(86.82592) 
9.296886 
(8.726694) 
Imports 
-973.0273 
(1143.444) 
149.8089 
(38.92803)** 
26.73069 
(81.05456) 
Successes completely 
determined 14 8 3 8 8 
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis 
*= Statistical significance at 10% level   **= Statistical significance at 5% level
Table 3  
 
 Rankings based z-scores as determined using the probit model  
 
 Countries ranked by z-score produced from the coefficients and constant yielded by the 
probit model for explanatory variables land mass and GDP. Spain and Iran are non-members of 
the G-20 who were ranked in the top nineteen. Turkey and South Africa are G-20 members 
ranked outside of the top nineteen, and the line separates places nineteen and twenty.  
 
Country β GDP GDP β Land Mass Land Mass Constant Z-Value 
United States 228.7388 0.189008051 144.5543 0.069379537 -3.766754 53.2625852 
China 228.7388 0.10872873 144.5543 0.067757681 -3.766754 34.6651434 
Russia 228.7388 0.026814269 144.5543 0.120719176 -3.766754 23.5839397 
Canada 228.7388 0.017802486 144.5543 0.070495033 -3.766754 14.2624794 
Japan 228.7388 0.060507969 144.5543 0.002668203 -3.766754 14.2262204 
Brazil 228.7388 0.021995283 144.5543 0.060117814 -3.766754 13.7214632 
India 228.7388 0.042914566 144.5543 0.023209151 -3.766754 13.1712089 
Australia 228.7388 0.011776492 144.5543 0.054655543 -3.766754 10.5944344 
Germany 228.7388 0.040863177 144.5543 0.002520692 -3.766754 9.71137094 
France 228.7388 0.029935271 144.5543 0.004542805 -3.766754 7.50403996 
U.K. 228.7388 0.031220949 144.5543 0.001719966 -3.766754 7.39007089 
Italy 228.7388 0.026718311 144.5543 0.002127559 -3.766754 6.4190622 
Mexico 228.7388 0.018809893 144.5543 0.013869129 -3.766754 6.30739459 
Spain 228.7388 0.018626881 144.5543 0.003568077 -3.766754 4.77647128 
Indonesia 228.7388 0.012151525 144.5543 0.013446879 -3.766754 4.72332943 
Argentina 228.7388 0.006225904 144.5543 0.019630533 -3.766754 4.26178377 
Iran 228.7388 0.009964357 144.5543 0.011636795 -3.766754 3.96138382 
South Korea 228.7388 0.016747396 144.5543 0.000704056 -3.766754 3.93255359 
Saudi Arabia 228.7388 0.0068992 144.5543 0.015177514 -3.766754 3.77208964 
Kazakhstan 228.7388 0.002105765 144.5543 0.019238684 -3.766754 3.26270466 
Turkey 228.7388 0.010425627 144.5543 0.005532204 -3.766754 3.18444929 
Algeria 228.7388 0.002707339 144.5543 0.01681587 -3.766754 3.05007979 
Sudan 228.7388 0.001115323 144.5543 0.017691859 -3.766754 2.81255194 
D. R. Congo 228.7388 0.00021093 144.5543 0.016555464 -3.766754 2.44141138 
South Africa 228.7388 0.005060411 144.5543 0.008607174 -3.766754 2.40171635 
Poland 228.7388 0.008180247 144.5543 0.002207658 -3.766754 2.19026634 
Colombia 228.7388 0.004305449 144.5543 0.008041077 -3.766754 2.14719549 
Netherlands 228.7388 0.009160052 144.5543 0.000293307 -3.766754 2.13765809 
Thailand 228.7388 0.007045981 144.5543 0.003622795 -3.766754 2.13537983 
Egypt 228.7388 0.004787119 144.5543 0.007070564 -3.766754 2.11708029 
Libya 228.7388 0.001364913 144.5543 0.012422927 -3.766754 2.10799608 
Pakistan 228.7388 0.005401514 144.5543 0.005620691 -3.766754 2.04803088 
Table 4  
 
Derived ranking calculated by multiplying land mass and GDP 
 
Iran and Spain are non-members of the G-20 who were ranked in the top nineteen. South 
Africa and South Korea are G-20 members ranked outside of the top nineteen, the line separates 
places nineteen and twenty.  
 
 
Country GDP Land Mass Total 
United States 0.189008051 0.069379537 0.013113291 
China 0.10872873 0.067757681 0.007367207 
Russia 0.026814269 0.120719176 0.003236996 
Brazil 0.021995283 0.060117814 0.001322308 
Canada 0.017802486 0.070495033 0.001254987 
India 0.042914566 0.023209151 0.000996011 
Australia 0.011776492 0.054655543 0.000643651 
Mexico 0.018809893 0.013869129 0.000260877 
Indonesia 0.012151525 0.013446879 0.0001634 
Japan 0.060507969 0.002668203 0.000161448 
France 0.029935271 0.004542805 0.00013599 
Argentina 0.006225904 0.019630533 0.000122218 
Iran 0.009964357 0.011636795 0.000115953 
Saudi Arabia 0.0068992 0.015177514 0.000104713 
Germany 0.040863177 0.002520692 0.000103003 
Spain 0.018626881 0.003568077 6.64622E-05 
Turkey 0.010425627 0.005532204 5.76767E-05 
Italy 0.026718311 0.002127559 5.68448E-05 
U.K. 0.031220949 0.001719966 5.3699E-05 
Algeria 0.002707339 0.01681587 4.55263E-05 
South Africa 0.005060411 0.008607174 4.35558E-05 
Kazakhstan 0.002105765 0.019238684 4.05122E-05 
Colombia 0.004305449 0.008041077 3.46204E-05 
Egypt 0.004787119 0.007070564 3.38476E-05 
Pakistan 0.005401514 0.005620691 3.03602E-05 
Thailand 0.007045981 0.003622795 2.55261E-05 
Peru 0.00258767 0.009074045 2.34806E-05 
Nigeria 0.003513167 0.006522104 2.29132E-05 
Venezuela 0.003253182 0.006439371 2.09484E-05 
Sudan 0.001115323 0.017691859 1.97321E-05 
Ukraine 0.004255771 0.00426126 1.81349E-05 
Poland 0.008180247 0.002207658 1.80592E-05 
Libya 0.001364913 0.012422927 1.69562E-05 
Sweden 0.004800233 0.00317923 1.5261E-05 
Chile 0.002709264 0.005338327 1.44629E-05 
South Korea 0.016747396 0.000704056 1.17911E-05 
Malaysia 0.004224803 0.002328828 9.83884E-06 
Norway 0.003398001 0.002286148 7.76833E-06 
Table 5  
 
Derived ranking calculated by multiplying GDP, land mass, imports and political freedom  
 
Spain is the only non-member ranked in the top nineteen. South Africa is the only G-20 
country ranked outside of the top nineteen. The line represents delineates between ranks 
nineteen and twenty. 
 
Country Land Mass GDP Imports Political Freedom Total 
United States 0.06938 0.189008 0.121524 0.9 0.001434227 
China 0.067758 0.108729 0.083464 0.35 0.000215214 
Canada 0.070495 0.017802 0.025952 0.9 2.9313E-05 
Russia 0.120719 0.026814 0.015154 0.45 2.20738E-05 
India 0.023209 0.042915 0.020882 0.75 1.5599E-05 
Brazil 0.060118 0.021995 0.011986 0.8 1.26798E-05 
Australia 0.054656 0.011776 0.012797 0.9 7.41336E-06 
Germany 0.002521 0.040863 0.071523 0.9 6.63036E-06 
Japan 0.002668 0.060508 0.040666 0.85 5.58057E-06 
France 0.004543 0.029935 0.036892 0.9 4.5152E-06 
Mexico 0.013869 0.01881 0.019541 0.75 3.82334E-06 
U.K. 0.00172 0.031221 0.034899 0.9 1.68664E-06 
Italy 0.002128 0.026718 0.029356 0.85 1.41843E-06 
Spain 0.003568 0.018627 0.020729 0.9 1.23991E-06 
Indonesia 0.013447 0.012152 0.007095 0.75 8.69466E-07 
Turkey 0.005532 0.010426 0.01062 0.7 4.28761E-07 
Argentina 0.019631 0.006226 0.00336 0.8 3.28487E-07 
South Korea 0.000704 0.016747 0.026687 0.85 2.67467E-07 
Saudi Arabia 0.015178 0.006899 0.006333 0.35 2.32099E-07 
Iran 0.011637 0.009964 0.003766 0.4 1.74662E-07 
Poland 0.002208 0.00818 0.01069 0.9 1.73749E-07 
South Africa 0.008607 0.00506 0.00492 0.8 1.71426E-07 
Thailand 0.003623 0.007046 0.01002 0.55 1.40668E-07 
Sweden 0.003179 0.0048 0.010128 0.9 1.39109E-07 
Malaysia 0.002329 0.004225 0.011131 0.6 6.57079E-08 
Netherlands 0.000293 0.00916 0.02608 0.9 6.30628E-08 
Colombia 0.008041 0.004305 0.002316 0.65 5.21073E-08 
Algeria 0.016816 0.002707 0.002367 0.45 4.84978E-08 
Ukraine 0.004261 0.004256 0.003419 0.75 4.6503E-08 
 
